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GENETIC DETERMINISM OR GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION?
George P. Smith, II*
Thaddeus J. Burns**
"Anatomy is destiny."
Sigmund Freudt
"A man consists of some seven octillion (7 X 1027) atoms,
grouped in about ten trillion (1013) cells."
Theodosius Dobzhanskyt
INTRODUCTION
The publication of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in 1946 predated
the discovery by James Watson and Francis Crick of deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) by seven years.' Commentators continue to view the signifi-
cance of advances in recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology through the
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t XI THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey ed. & transl., 1910) 89; XIX 178 (1961).
t GENETICS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 1 (1970).
1. James Watson & Francis Crick, Genetic Implications of the Structure of Deox-
yribonucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 964 (1953).
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lens of Huxley's totalitarian society,2 a genetic caste system made possi-
ble by genetic technology.3 The alternative characterization of such tech-
nology as a grail to treat or heal inherited diseases is perhaps less
alarming, but similarly fails to adequately describe the current state of
technology both from the perspective of identifying specific genetic traits
and developing gene therapy.4 Nevertheless, in 1993, the fortieth anni-
versary of the discovery of the structure of DNA,5 the Human Genome
Initiative continues its mapping of the human genome.6 The accelerated
pace of mapping that began in the early 1970s' is expected to continue
due to innovations in genome mapping and sequencing.'
The salutary effect of this technology and the ability to catalog and
analyze the genotype of a particular individual create the potential for
abuse of such information. Indeed, for some, the eugenics movement9
2. Kimberley Nobles, Note, Birthright or Life Sentence: Controlling the Threat of Ge-
netic Testing, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2081 (1992). See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOL-
OGY: LAW, ETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS,
ETmIcs AND THE LAW (1981); George P. Smith, II, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Juris-
prudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1975).
3. Such rDNA advances include germ-cell or germ-line therapy, whereby genes
within sperm or eggs are replaced or repaired to the effect that such modified genetic
material is passed on to the next generation. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOL-
OGY, MEDICINE, AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: SPECIAL REPORT 40 (Doc. No. OTA-CIT-371
U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 1988). In contrast, somatic cell therapy does not
cause inherited or inheritable changes. It might provide, for instance, a means of replacing
the defective gene in the bone marrow cells of a child affected by genetic immune defi-
ciency. If successful, such therapy would "cure" the child but would have no effect on his
or her own offspring. Id.; see also The Aim is to Get Genes to Do the Work, NEWSDAY,
July 6, 1993, at 59. See generally D. NELKIN & L. TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS:
THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION (1989); Sir Gustav Nossal, Symposium,
Introduction, HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION: SCIENCE, LAW AND ETHICS (1990).
4. THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles et al. eds., 1992). See-generally George P. Smith, II, Uncertain-
ties on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and the New Biology, 41 THE PHAROS 10 (1978).
5. The Aim is to Get Genes to Do the Work, supra note 3, at 59. See also Changing
your Genes, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1992, at 11; Leon Jaroff, Making the Best of a Bad
Gene, TIME, Feb. 10, 1992, at 78.
6. See Carol Lee, Comment, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential for Genetic
Discrimination by the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REV. 189, 195 (1993).
7. Clive Cookson, The Men Who Would Play God, THE FINANCIAL POST (Wkly.
Ed.), Feb. 10, 1992, at S37.
8. Daniel Kevles & Leroy Hood, The DeoxyriboNucleic Acid Test, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Dec. 5, 1992, (Section Z1), at 8.
9. "The basic idea of eugenics was to improve the human stock pool by increasing the
number of supposedly desirable human beings ("positive" eugenics) and getting rid of un-
desirable ones ("negative" eugenics)." Id. In Nazi Germany, the eugenics movement ratio-
nalized policies of mass sterilization and ultimately the creation of death camps for the
extermination of individuals deemed undesirable by virtue of ethnicity, religion, or sexual
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still casts a shadow over the Human Genome Project. The risks of abuse
engendered by the mapping of the human genome and emergent rDNA
technology do not extend to social engineering and the development of a
"superior" human, a process necessitating germ-line modification.
Rather, the potential abuse may result from discrimination based on the
dissemination of key information about the genotype of an individual-
information revealing the risk factors inherent in that individual.' ° Ge-
netic data is a particularly sensitive category of health care information."
Unlike information about a specific transient condition or illness, data
pointing to a genetic disorder will affect, and may stigmatize, a person
throughout his or her life.' 2 The handling of genetic information by the
state or its agents, therefore, implicates individual liberty interests de-
rived from fundamental constitutional rights to equality and privacy.' 3 In
orientation. Id. Similarly, in the United States, many states enacted sterilization laws justi-
fied in large part by eugenic principles. Id. In California alone, 6,255 individuals were
sterilized by 1929. Id. Most of these laws were overturned, however, by a decision of the
United States Supreme Court in 1942. Id.; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
10. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476,479, 481 (1992). The findings of this study affirm the existence
of discrimination against individuals who are completely asymptomatic, their only "abnor-
mality" lies in their genotypes. Id. at 479. Indeed, it appears that genetic conditions are
regarded by many social institutions (i.e. insurance companies) as:
[E]xtremely, serious, disabling, or even lethal conditions ... without regard to the
fact that many individuals with "abnormal" genotypes will either be perfectly
healthy, have medical conditions which can be controlled by treatment, or suffer
only mild forms of a disease.... As a result of these misconceptions, decisions by
such institutions are made solely on the basis of an associated diagnostic label
rather than the actual health status of the individual or family.
Id. at 481. It appears that the evaluation of genetic conditions by such institutions reflects
a lack of understanding of such basic concepts as incomplete genetic penetrance, variable
expressivity, and genetic heterogeneity. Id. at 479. See generally Andrea DeGorgey, Note,
The Advent of DNA Databanks: Implications for Information Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. &
MED., 381 (1990).
11. L. Andrews, The Future of Confidentiality of Genetic Information, in MEDICAL
GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 209 (1987); see George P. Smith, II, Genetics, Eugenics
and Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435 (1985).
12. Andrews, supra note 11j at 187-88, 209. "Unlike an infectious disease, a genetic
disorder is generally immutable." Id. "Thus, an inappropriate disclosure may ... cause
serious financial, emotional, and perhaps even physical harm to the individual in question."
Id.
13. Id. See Neil A. Holtzman, Recombinant DNA Technology, Genetic Tests, and Pub-
lic Policy, 42 AM. J. HUM. GENETiCS 624 (1988). See generally George P. Smith, II, Bio-
technology and the Law: Social Responsibility or Freedom of Scientific Inquiry?, 36
MERCER L. REv. 437 (1988). One leading commentator has proposed four basic privacy
rules for DNA databanks. See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Pro-
tecting Coded "Future Diaries", 270 JAMA 2346, 2349 (1993). First, "[n]o such databanks
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this context, genetic discrimination has been defined as "discrimination
against an individual or against members of that individual's family solely
because of real or perceived differences from the 'normal' genome in the
genetic constitution of that individual."14 Individuals identified at risk
are:
(1) those . . .who are asymptomatic but carry a gene(s) that
increases the probability that they will develop some disease, (2)
individuals who are heterozygotes (carriers) for some recessive
or X-linked genetic condition but who are and will remain
asymptomatic, (3) individuals who have one or more genetic
polymorphisms that are not known to cause any medical condi-
tion, and (4) immediate relatives of individuals with known or
presumed genetic conditions. 5
Forms of genetic discrimination will most likely appear in two contexts:
employment and insurance. This is because individuals such as those
mentioned above are asymptomatic or presymptomatic and therefore not
readily identified.' 6 Both employers and insurers may believe that such
discrimination is warranted for the profitable conduct of business.' 7 Fur-
thermore, employers and insurers generally have access to detailed medi-
should be created or commence storing DNA samples until" public notice and justification
are given for establishing such a bank, "a privacy impact statement has been prepared and
filed with a designated public agency" and a burden has been placed on the bank to prove
that it advances a significant medical or societal goal. Id. Second, no collection or storage
of DNA samples can be undertaken without prior written agreement setting forth the pur-
poses and uses (including commercial) permitted of the samples and recognized guarantees
of individual access to all samples and records thereof, given together with a right to not
only correct inaccurate information but an additional right recognized to order the destruc-
tion of the sample should the databank change significantly its identity or, for that matter,
cease operation altogether. Id. Third, strict security policies should be set which require
the DNA samples to be used exclusively for the purposes for which they are collected-
with access by third parties being controlled strictly. Id. Fourth, "[miechanisms should be
developed to notify and counsel those whose DNA samples are in storage when new infor-
mation that can have a significant health impact on the individuals is obtainable, from their
stored DNA sample." Id.
14. Marvin R. Natowicz et al.,, Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 465, 466 (1992). The authors "distinguish genetic discrimination from discrimi-
nation based on disability caused by altered genes" and thereby clarify the point that ge-
netic discrimination is not based on any notion of the present function of the individual;
rather the discriminating party relies on that individual's genotype to assess risk of future
dysfunction. Id. As discussed later in this essay, current federal law does not address such
discrimination.
15. Natowicz, supra note 14, at 466.
16. Id. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITOR-
ING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE (1990).
17. See Natowicz, supra note 14, at 467.
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cal records of their employees or insureds.18 For example, a job applicant
may be subject to employment discrimination based on information ob-
tained through genetic testing for several reasons: increased medical and
insurance premiums, absenteeism, lowered productivity, enhanced risk in
the line of duty, and concomitantly, greater worker's compensation liabil-
ity.19 In the area of insurance, genetic testing potentially undermines the
principle that the insurer and the insured should be afforded identical
information concerning the risk of an insured individual becoming ill. 2
The availability of the genotype of a particular individual either to the
insurer or to the insured alone presents the possibility of adverse selec-
tion.21 For example, an individual who knows he or she is at risk for
developing Huntington's chorea will buy more "life or health insurance
knowing that he or she is at increased risk of death" or serious illness.22
Alternatively, an insurer with information suggesting that an applicant is
in a high-risk category will likely severely limit or not offer coverage. 23
18. Id. at 466-67. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Screening in Employment: Some
Legal, Ethical and Societal Issues, 1 INT'L J. BIoETHIcS 239 (1990); Rick Weiss, Bio-Men-
ace: Genetic Discrimination, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1989, at D3. It is to be remembered
that while not all employment discrimination is inefficient, this does not mean "that it is or
should be lawful." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 337 (4th ed. 1992).
19. Nobles, supra note 2, at 2089. A more accurate measure of safety risk, instead of
utilizing genetic testing, would be a test of an individual's actual capacity to function in a
safety sensitive job. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Use of Genetic Testing of Em-
ployees, 226 JAMA 1827, 1828 (1991).
20. Nobles, supra note 2, at 2089. Over time, as the costs of genetic testing decrease
and the degree of accuracy increases, insurers may find it not only cost effective to screen
genetically prospective clients but indeed a competitive necessity. The central problem for
insurers who either perform genetic testing themselves or obtain genetic information about
such tests performed independently, is that this practice would lead in all likelihood to,
discrimination (i.e. higher premiums or rejection altogether) against those who carry genes
or genetic markers which dispose them to future illness. And interestingly, because each
individual has potentially anywhere from four to eight genes which can cause disease, eve-
ryone seeking to enter the active work force is at risk for being genetically discriminated,
against by aggressive high-tech insurance companies. Susan O'Hara, Note, The Use of
Genetic Testing in the Health Insurance Industry: The Creation of a "Biologic Underclass",
22 Sw. U. L. REv. 1211,.1220-25 (1993); Shannon Brownless & Joanne Silberner, The,
Assurances of Genes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 23, 1990, at 57; Sandra Blakes-
lee, Genetic Discoveries Raise Painful Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1987, at C1 (quoting
Dr. Aubrey Milunsky).
21. Nobles, supra note 2, at 2089.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2090. Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and North Carolina have enacted leg-
islation prohibiting discrimination in employment and insurance based on carrying the
sickle-cell trait, hemoglobin C trait, Thalessemia, Tay-Sachs or cystic fibrosis. FLA. STAT.,
ch. 448.076 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 22:652.1, 23:1002A (West 1992); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 10:5-12, 10:5-5 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-51-45, 58-58-25, 95-28-1 (1992).
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The prospect of refusing to provide insurance to individuals because of
a genetic trait is inequitable and contrary to public policy.24 First, carriers
of defective genes may never develop symptoms that affect their ability to
function.25 More important, however, such disparate treatment and re-
sulting risk minimization vitiates the purpose of traditional private insur-
ance as a risk-spreading mechanism.26
The first part of this essay evaluates the contemporary focus of the ge-
netic revolution as seen through the Human Genome Initiative, a project
that brings not only great hopes for new advancements in genetic knowl-
edge designed to control disease and minimize human suffering, but
raises real fears of unabated invasions of personal privacy that in turn
would lead to discrimination for those individuals found to be genetically
handicapped. The extent to which this central fear is justified is explored
within the present context of the Genome Initiative, together with past
genetic screening practices.
Next, the four basic types of genetic engineering currently available for
use will be discussed as a background for analyzing the impact of these
technologies on society's preoccupation with biological determinism. The
ethical and philosophical conundrums created by the new genetics will in
turn be considered with the realization that the theories for resolving
these issues impact directly upon the formation of legal norms.
The essay then explores constitutional and legislative protections for
individuals who, as a result of a particular genetic makeup, might be sub-
ject to discrimination. To this end, it first examines safeguards from dis-
crimination based on genotype arguably afforded to individuals under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion. The essay then proceeds to examine the extent to which the confi-
dentiality of genetic material is protected by the fundamental right to
privacy derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. Finally, the essay analyzes the Human Genome
Privacy Act, one legislative attempt to provide individuals protection
from discrimination based upon genotype.
The essay concludes that while there are risks associated with the pur-
suit and development of genetics, man's dehumanization and depersonal-
ization need not be fostered as a consequence of the Human Genome
Initiative. Rather, so long as science pursues its basic quest for knowl-
24. Nobles, supra note 2, at 2090.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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edge with the purpose of establishing truth and integrity, and promotes
the goal of minimizing human suffering and maximizing social good, the
noble integrity of evolution and genetic progress will be preserved and
irrational fears of eugenic supremacy being advanced by genetic screen-
ing programs will be dispelled. Restraining scientific inquiry and the ap-
plication of its results should be limited only to actions considered
unreasonable or contrary to public policy or in violation of constitutional
norms.
I. THE HUMAN GENOME INITIATIVE
The human genome refers simply to the twenty-three pairs of chromo-
somes that all humans carry within which all human genes reside-and,
more specifically, those genes that contribute directly to traits such as
height, eye color, the shape of body parts, and human behavior.27 Dis-
eases develop when alterations, known as mutations of the genes, occur.
In all, "more than two thousand disease conditions have their origins in
single gene defects."2
The Human Genome Initiative is an undertaking funded by the U.S.
Congress and coordinated by the United States Department of Energy
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The initiative will complete
"mapping" all 50,000 to 100,000 human genes within fifteen years.29 In-
terestingly, there is no single human genome project in the United States.
Rather, three major organizations-the NIH, the Department of Energy
(DOE), and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute-finance specific as-
pects of an overall "initiative" on genome mapping. Simultaneous work
efforts are also ongoing in other countries and by a private organization,
the Human Genome Organization (HUGO).30
27. Jon Beckwith, Foreword: The Human Genome Initiative: Genetics' Lighting Rod,
17 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2 (1991). See MAXINE SINGER & PAUL BERG, GENES & GENOME:
A CHANGING PERSPECTIVE (1991).
28. Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1037, 1043 (1993).
29. Seth Lubove, Genome Wildcatters, FORBES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 97; James D. Watson,
The Human Genome Project: Past, Present and Future, 248 SCIENCE 44 (1990). See gener-
ally J. BISHOP & M. WALDHOZ, GENOME: THE STORY OF THE MOST ASTONISHING SCIEN-
TIFIC ADVENTURE OF OUR TIME-THE ATTEMPT TO MAP ALL THE GENES IN THE HUMAN
BODY (1990).
30. See MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH: A REVIEW OF
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS (Diane J. McLaren ed., 1991); OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAPPING OUR GENES: GENOME
PROJECTS: How BIG, How FAST? (1988). See also George J. Annas, Mapping the Human
Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 637 (1990); John C.
1994]
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As of March, 1993, 2,736 of the targeted genes "had been 'mapped'-
located precisely on one of the twenty-[three] human chromosomes
[pairs]."31 "Of those, 682 are known to be associated with human disease
when they occur in mutant form."'32 "In 321, researchers have decoded at
least part of the 'sequence', or precise chemical structure, which is the
first step in determining precisely how a gene works.",
33
The driving motive behind the Human Genome Initiative is then quite
simple and direct: the identification and eradication of all genetically
based disease. With more than 2,000 conditions recognized as having
their origins in single gene defects,34 the ultimate success of the Initiative
holds awesome opportunities for improving the health of all world citi-
zens and minimizing human suffering from disease.3" Yet, the secrets of
the genome-when revealed-will generate a whole array of what-if
fears: from the unbridled use of genetic information to advance a pro-
gram of positive eugenics 36 to concerns that disclosure of an individual's
genetic profile and his susceptibility to illness, will, in turn, form "the ba-
sis for discriminatory action or stigmatization."37 The possible result is
that an insurer will "refuse to pay medical costs if an individual elects not
to undergo a recommended treatment, or if a child with a prenatally iden-
tified genetic defect is born."3"
Equally worrisome is the fear that the "[w]idespread delineation of ge-
netic profiles could result in centralization of the [genetic] information
much as credit information is centralized today."'39 Because DNA se-
quence data bases are prone to error, there is also concern that even in
the event gene mapping were to become routine, "comparison of an indi-
vidual's genetic profile to an error-ridden prototype could have the same
Fletcher, Where in the World are We Going with the New Genetics? 5 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 33 (1989).
31. David Brown, Filling in Gene Map, But Far From Home, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1993, at A3; Daniel E. Koshland, Sequences and Consequences of the Human Genome, 246
SCIENCE 189 (1989).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Barrad, supra note 28, at 1043.
35. See Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, supra
note 2, at 733; see also Rick Weiss, The Good, the Bad, & the Unknown, WASH. POST, Oct.
11, 1994, (Health Magazine), at 7.
36. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW, ch. 5 (1981). See also
PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 120 (1977).
37. Id.
38. Barrad, supra note 28, at 1046.
39. Id. at 1047.
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stigmatizing effect as do false positives on drug tests and tests for the HIV
antibody.'
Genetic Knowledge
Once a "disease gene" is discovered, the announcement of its discovery
normally incorporates a suggestion that treatments are forthcoming. Yet
discovering the mechanism of a disease is not the same as knowing how
to alter that mechanism. With genetic information of this type, however,
at least a chance is created for developing an effective therapy to combat
the genetic disease.4
The "heuristics of fear" all too often blot out rational analysis of
emerging genetic knowledge.4 2 This adds little to the need to "promote
medically and ethically informed public discussion."43 This discussion
should occur within "'communities of moral discourse' in which the scien-
tific, medical, ethical and political issues are engaged by informed and
intelligent persons who represent different interests and different per-
spectives on the nature of humanness and human well-being."" Caution
should always be the watch-word, however, in examining genetic assump-
tions; and over-simplification of genetic findings should be avoided.45
As much as law should seek to avoid ambiguity, it should not rely on
science for definitive answers; for science-within its own sphere-simply
does not offer unambiguous answers.46 Two forms of uncertainty are in-
herent in any scientific undertaking: one is "conceptual" and derives
from fundamental changes in those concepts engendered by the new bio-
technologies and the other is termed "occurrence" and applies to select
issues that cannot be addressed readily.47
The "image of neutrality" that science has sought to cultivate or sell "is
largely a myth originating in the efforts of scientists to maintain auton-
40. Id.
41. Brown, supra note 31, at A3.
42. See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHIC
FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 26-27 (1984).
43. James M. Gustafson, Genetic Therapy: Ethical and Religious Reflections, 8 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 183, 190 (1992).
44. Id. at 199, 200.
45. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND. L. REv. 313, 348 (1993).
46. Id. at 343, 345.
47. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE,
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE SOCIAL &
ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 22 (1982).
19941
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omy" and thus "blunt pressures from the church and from the state" for
intervention and control.4" Indeed, "the history of science is replete with
cases where the choice of research topics, the nature of scientific theories,
and the representation of research results are socially constructed, and
shaped by cultural forces, to reflect ... assumptions of particular socie-
ties at particular times.",4
9
In 1990, the federal government's Center for Biologics, Evaluation and
Research at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved efforts
to undertake human gene therapy.5° Recognized as a "radical but un-
proven" method of fighting disease, the therapy involves the transfer. of
genetic information contained in DNA into specific cells to replace ab-
sent or deficiently functioning genes within those cells.51 Initial experi-
mentation trials will focus on the treatment of two different diseases:
adenosine deaminase (ADA), a rare and congenital immune system de-
fect, and metastatic melanoma, an advanced malignant cancer, virtually
untreatable once it invades secondary organs. 52
II. GENETIC ENGINEERING FORMS
According to Dr. W. French Anderson, there are four levels of the ap-
plication of genetic engineering: somatic cell gene therapy (SCGT), germ
line therapy (GLGT), enhancement genetic engineering (EGE), and eu-
genic engineering.53 Each of these applications raises complex ethical
48. Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 45, at 339-40. For example, the authors point to the
evolution of Darwin's theory of Natural Selection into a theory of Social Darwinism as a
biological defense of the changing forces of industrialization. Id. They also point out that
Gregor Mendel's theories of genetics and Francis Galton's eugenic principles "were being
used to prove that deviant behavior and low IQ were hereditary." Id.
49. Id. at 339. William Booth, FDA Approves Cancer Therapy for Use in Cancer Treat-
ment, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1990, at Al, A12. See generally W. French Anderson, Human
Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considerations, 10 J. MED. & PHILOSOPHY, 275
(1985).
50. Booth, supra note 49, at A12. See Francois Gros, Gene Therapy: Present Situation,
and Future Prospects, 2 NEUROMUSCULAR DISORDERS 75 (1992); Cournoyer et al., Gene,
Therapy: A New Approach for the Treatment of Genetic Disorders, 47 CLINICAL PHARMA-
COLOGY & THERAPEUtnCS 1 (1990).
51. Booth, supra note 49, at Al. See also Larry Thompson, Gene Therapy in Humans
Approved, WASH. POST, July 31, 1990, at A3; Larry Thompson, Medicine's Four-Year-Old
Pioneer: First Gene-Therapy Patient Opens Door to Treating 4,000 Inherited Diseases,
WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1990, (Health Magazine), at 8-9.
52. Booth, supra note 49, at Al, A12. See also Larry Thompson, Scientists Turn Off
Growth of Cancer Cells: Experiments in Gene Therapy Show Promise in Laboratory,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 11, 1990, (Health Magazine), at 6. See generally Milo Gibaldi, Human
Gene Therapy, 13 PHARMACOTHERAPY 79 (1993).
53. In early September, 1994, a federal advisory board voted to allow some fast-track
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and scientific issues. 4 The most amenable approach to solving the effects
of a broad spectrum of inherited diseases is to be found with somatic cell
gene therapy-yet, it is the only one of four that is yet to be justified
through scientific verification and ethical acceptance. 55
Somatic cell gene therapy, the first level, involves a gene transfer into
the somatic (body) cells of a human in order to correct a genetic defect.56
If the therapy is developed fully, it would result-when used-in replac-
ing defective or absent enzymes or proteins (the product of genes) that
are necessary for a cell to function properly. Already by 1992, within the
National Institutes of Health and its Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee, eleven gene therapy trials had been approved and seven more
were under consideration.' It is expected that within the next two years,
applications will quadruple.5 7
Still in its infancy, the second level, germ line therapy, seeks to insert a
gene into the reproductive cells of the germ cells of an afflicted patient.5"
In addition to combatting genetic disease, other ailments, such as cancer,
proposals to be submitted directly to 'the Food and Drug Administration by scientists wish-
ing to perform certain genetic experiments on people with the purpose of providing treat-
ment for genetic diseases. Rick Weiss, Regulations are Eased on Genetic Experiments,
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1994, (Health Magazine), at 5. Previously, scientific proposals of
this nature had to be submitted to a committee within the National Institutes of Health
Committee composed of scientists, ethicists and community members, where the request
was evaluated in a public forum and testimony taken from patient advocates and con-
cerned citizens alike. Id. The new FDA procedure bars public participation. Id. The "fast
track" procedure was promoted by AIDS activists because of their concerns that new ge-
netic therapies for the treatment of AIDS had become mired in the federal bureaucracy.
Id.
Some members of the DNA Advisory Committee of NIH, a committee that would be
bypassed in some cases by the new FDA rules, have expressed concern that many gene
therapy protocols reviewed by them are not only poorly designed but have not been tested
adequately on animals and commonly understate the risks or overstate the potential bene-
fits. Id. The members argue that problems of this nature have a greater chance of being
resolved if considered in open meetings rather than under the fast track FDA procedure.
Id.
54. Anderson, supra note 49, at 285-87. See generally Hearings on Human Genetic
Engineering Before Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the Committee on Science
and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Rick Weiss, Scientists Making Gains Against
Inherited Diseases Find Their Task Harder Than Expected: Gene Therapy at the Cross-
roads, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1994, (Health Magazine), at 12.
55. Anderson, supra note 49, at 284-86.
56. Robin Herman, Tinkering With the Essence of Humanity: Scientists and Theolo-
gians Debate the Morality of Genetic Engineering, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1991, (Health Mag-
azine), at 6; Anderson, supra note 49, at 275.
57. Robin Herman, Gene Therapy is No Longer a Rarity, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1992,
(Health Magazine), at 7.
58. Herman, supra note 56, at 6.
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heart and vascular disease, could be treated by this type of gene therapy.
While germ line changes have been accomplished successfully in mice,
germ line therapy has yet to be performed in humans. 9
History was made in September, 1990, when a four-year-old girl re-
ceived the world's first gene therapy in the treatment of an immunologi-
cal disorder.' Another milestone was achieved when in January, 1992, a
two-year-old child who was suffering from a neuroblastoma tumor was
treated with genetically altered bone marrow cells." Termed gene ther-
apy, this medical procedure altered the genetic material of a patient in
order to combat disease at its cellular source. It subsequently was per-
formed on twenty-two patients and became a viable strategy for uncover-
ing new approaches to fighting incurable diseases. This therapy has not
only been tested, developed, and applied in the United States, but has
been proposed and/or initiated in Canada, China, Italy, France, and
Japan.62
The third level, enhancement engineering, is effected by inserting a
gene into a patient's reproductive tissues, thus correcting the disorder in
his or her potential offspring.6 For example, in order to "'enhance' a
known characteristic . .. an additional growth hormone gene" could be
inserted into a normal child. 64 While the enhancement of somatic cells is
now feasible and has been performed in animal experiments, the en-
hancement of germ-line cells. is not yet technically feasible.
The fourth level of engineeringI-recognized as eugenic in focus-
seeks, by definition, to "alter or 'improve' complex human traits, each of
which is coded by a large number of genes: for example, personality,
[and] intelligence. '61 This level is not thought to be feasible in the fore-
seeable future. Indeed, the processes associated with it may be "so com-
plex that it may never be feasible."'
A. Toward a Principle of Biological Determination
Today's society exhibits a new and discernible preoccupation with bio-
logical determinism. Successes in developing genetic tests that have lo-
59. Id.
60. Herman, supra note 57, at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Herman, supra note 56, at 6.
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cated markers reflecting predisposition to single gene disorders have
engendered "hope that more complex conditions such as cancer, drug de-
pendency and mental illness, will ultimately be predictable."67 Building
upon the limited successes with Huntington's chorea, many "states now
mandate the use of genetic testing for conditions such as phenylketonuria
(PKU) in newborn infants." 68
Biological determinism evolves from the principle of genetic essential-
ism that posits personal traits-such as mental illness, homosexuality, ag-
gressive personality, dangerousness, exhibitionism, stress, and shyness-
have a genetic or biological disposition and, indeed, are predictable and
determinable at conception.69 Thus, the social context in which the traits
are manifested is minimized under this principle.70 In a word, biological
determinism recognizes essentially that one's fate is determined by ge-
netic inheritance.7'
B. Contemporary Perspectives
A recent survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates for The
March of Dimes polled 1,000 people in the United States regarding their
views of genetic testing and gene therapy. Although those surveyed did
not completely understand all the issues, 79% expressed their willingness
to undergo gene therapy if necessary, and 88% said they would have their
children undergo such therapy in order to prevent or cure a genetic dis-
67. Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 45, at 314.
68. Id. For an historical overview of early state mandated PKU testing between 1963
and 1968 and the state legislative citations to the 43 states where such genetic testing is
required, see Reilly, supra note 36, at 37, 49-52, ch. 4.
69. Dreyfus & Nelkin, supra note 45, at 320.
70. Id. at 320-32. See Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling
the Predetermination of a Child's Gender, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1992), where a justifica-
tion of sex selection is that its use serves to reduce or eliminate "certain sex-linked diseases
such as hemophilia, Cooley's Anemia, Down's syndrome and more than 400 others, that
increase aggregate social anxiety and tax society's medical and financial resources." Id. at
21.
71. Dr. James Watson, Director of the Human Genome Initiative, said, "our fate is in,
our genes." Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62, 67. Social analysts
differ in their views on the extent to which the pervasiveness of genetic determinism will be
felt. For, while the history of eugenics and racial hygiene was uneven and disturbing, it
occurred in an historical atmosphere where no countervailing forces of critical scrutiny
existed both from inside or outside the scientific and medical communities. The present
genome project, to the contrary, not only invokes scrutiny-but has built standards for re-
view into its operative procedures. ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE,
POLMCS, AND THE HUMAN GEN OE 254 (1994).
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ease that would usually be fatal if undetected.7 2 Approximately three-
quarters of those polled expressed concerns that gene therapy be under-
taken only according to "strict regulations."73 More than half of those
surveyed stated their belief that when a genetic disease is discovered,
someone needs to be apprised of this fact. Of those, approximately one-
third believed an employer should be advised of the genetic disease, 58%
concluded insurers should be informed, and 98% concluded one's spouse
or fianc6 should be told. In addition, 47% of those surveyed favored ex-
perimental gene therapy if its goal was to improve physical characteris-
tics, while 42% would allow gene therapy when its goal was to improve a
child's intelligence.74
III. ETHICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUMS
The new genetics raises no new ethical problems in the sense of unique
dilemmas not heretofore seen. The core issues of present ethical
problems in this field were indeed recognized in the late 1960s with the
introduction and widespread use of amniocentesis and carrier screen-
ing.75 The new genetics, however, will "magnify both the complexity and
frequency of these problems., 76 Behind the current problems facing soci-
ety is a national and international failure by medical geneticists to form,
and thereby validate in writing, agreements, protocols, or compacts that
address these ethical problems.7 7 Instead, a blind adherence to oral tradi-
tions is pursued. Clearly, without uniform ethical standards within the
scientific community, the power-brokers in human genetics are less ac-
72. Sandy Rovner, Many Americans Say Gene Therapy Okay, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
1992, (Health Magazine), at 5. See Howard Markel, The Stigma of Disease: Implications of
Genetic Screening, 93 AM. J. MED. 209 (1992).
73. Rovner, supra note 72, at 5.
74. Id. A December, 1993, poll of 500 adult Americans taken by Yankelovich Part-
ners, for TIME/CNN found a marked ambivalence among the respondents regarding ge-
netic research and its applications. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Genetic Revolution, TIME,
Jan. 17, 1994, at 48. For example, 49% said they would not take a genetic test that could
tell them what diseases they were likely to suffer later in life, while 50% said they would
like to know. Id. Most respondents strongly opposed the uses of human genetic engineer-
ing except for the purpose of curing disease or enhancing agricultural production. Id.
Fifty-eight percent, thought altering human genes was against the will of God. Id. Ninety
percent said it should be illegal to allow insurance companies to use genetic tests in order
to decide whom to insure. Id.
75. John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law & Medical Genetics: After the
Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 759 (1990).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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countable to the public for their actions.7"
According to John C. Fletcher and Dorothy C. Wertz, the eight
problems confronting geneticists and their patients, for which no standard
ethical structure exists for approaching resolutions, are:
1. Unequal access or non-access to services;
2. Moral conflict and concern over abortion choices for genetic
reasons in pregnancies;
3. Maintaining confidentiality in patient-geneticist relation-
ships and preventing non-consenting disclosures;
4. Protecting persons at higher genetic risks from invasions of
privacy by institutional third parties such as government
agencies, health insurers and employers;
5. A variety of disclosure dilemmas focusing on medical genet-
ics' potential to reveal without permission psychologically
sensitive information that can easily disrupt family and mar-
ital relations;
6. Non-medical and non-genetik indications for pre-natal
diagnosis;
7. Whether genetic services should be voluntary or mandatory;
8. The nature and extent of nondirective genetic counseling for
mentally or physically incapacitated patients.79
Professor John C. Fletcher, Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Reli-
gious Studies, and Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the
University of Virginia Medical School, conducted a study in 1984 of 1,053
geneticists at twenty-four genetics centers in twelve nations.80 In this
study, respondents ranked ten major ethical issues confronting the inter-
national community of geneticists:
1. Increased demand for genetic services;
2. Carrier screening;
3. Allocation of limited resources;
4. New treatments for genetic diseases;
5. Environmental damage to the unborn;
6. Screening for cancer and heart disease with genetic tests;
7. Research involving the human embryo;
8. Genetic screening in the workplace;
9. Long-range eugenic concerns;
10. Sex pre-selection. 81
78. Id. See SMITH, supra note 36, ch. 1.
79. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 75, at 761-65. See generally, George P. Smith, II,
Toward an International Standard of Scientific Injury, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 167 (1992).
80. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 75, at 774.
81. Id. at 774. "As the Human Genome Project quickens, tens, if not hundreds, of new
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A. Conflicts and Compatibilities
These two sets of ethical-philosophical problems share a primary con-
cern regarding the wide-reaching effects of genetic screening. Even
within this isolated issue, there is considerable debate among scholars
yielding antipodal viewpoints. Some scholars prefer to examine the ethi-
cal positions with the goal of grouping them into more manageable cate-
gories or schools of thought.8 2 Yet, even as these syntheses highlight the
vast range of conflicting ethical opinion, one central conflict recurs time
and time again: which is the more significant analytical value-quality of
life or sanctity of life? 3
Theologian Bernard Ramm agrees: "I think both Christian and non-
Christian are slowly coming to the conviction that the supreme norm in
ethics is the quality of life and not the sheer fact of life."' To be sure,
this issue is not confined solely to ethical and theological theories. Living
wills and legislation that ensures death with dignity have captured public
attention and sensitized many to ultimate quality of life considerations.8 "
The most likely objective of selective genetic screening is improvement
in the quality of life by identifying carriers and victims of genetic disease.
Reduction of the incidence of these illnesses and the suffering they cause
could be achieved through counseling, abortion, and genetic engineering
techniques.86 Although admittedly the ethical issues are complex, they
genetic screening tests will compete for introduction into routine clinical practice." Sher-
man Elias & George J. Annas, Generic Consent for Genetic Screening, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1611, 1611 (1994). Consequently, it is urged that new strategies based on general or,
"generic" consent should be developed for genetic screening. The aim of which would be
to provide sufficient information to permit patients to make informed decisions about car-
rier screening, yet avoid the information overload that could lead to 'misinformed' consent
Id. The stakes in reproductive genetics are inevitably high because they involve exercise of
a right to decide whether or not to engage in genetic testing-balanced by a coextensive
right, to refuse if a potential harm-in terms of stigma, for example-outweighs the bene-
fits derived from it for the at-risk individual or his family. Id.
82. Bernard Ramm, An Ethical Evaluation of Biogenetic Engineering, 26 J. AM. Sci.
AFFILIATION 137 (1974); Richard McCormick, Genetic Medicine: Notes on the Moral Liter-
ature, 33 THEO. STUD. 531 (1972).
83. See generally George P. Smith, II, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative,
or Apotheosis? 63 NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984).
84. Ramm, supra note 82, at 142.
85. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1989). See also
George P. Smith, II, Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Methuselah or Adhering to
the Kevorkian Ethic?, 2 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 49 (1993); George P. Smith, II,
All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlight-
ened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275 (1989).
86. SMITH, supra note 36. See George P. Smith, II, Genetics, Eugenics, and the Family:
Exploring the Yin and the Yang, 8 UNIV. TASMANIA L. REV. 4 (1984).
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ultimately are reducible to the most elemental questions of who is to live
and who is to die. Moreover, the question still remains as to who will
justify these decisions? Thus, even though the central dilemma is fairly
well structured, the solution is far from settled.
For the late Professor Joseph Fletcher, the evolution from the "old
vitalistic undiscriminating sanctity-or-quality-of-life ethics... to a respon-
sible, decisional quality-of-life ethics" 7 injects desirable elements of con-
trol and choice. It thus becomes a moral responsibility to control
"reproduction through sex selection or preemptive abortion in response
to a genetic defect., 8 Fletcher underscores his argument for the neces-
sity of genetic screening with a graphic example:
To go right ahead with coital reproduction in many couples'
cases, is like walking down a line of children blindfolded and
deliberately maiming every fourth child. It is cruel and insane
to deprive normal but disadvantaged children of the care we
could give them with the $1,500,000 we spend in public costs for
preventable retardates. 89
Fletcher adds what may be the credo of situation ethicists: "Ethics is not
loftily independent offeconomics and utilitarian or distributive justice." 9
And, what if the populace fails to make responsible reproductive choices
voluntarily? "[S]ometimes it is more compassionate to force [the moral
thing] to be done than to sacrifice the well-being of the many to the ego-
centric 'rights' of the few. This obviously is the ethics of a sane society.'91
Others suggest that the fundamental question to be addressed is: Sim-
ply because some things can be done, should they be undertaken?.' For
the late Paul Ramsey, there was a definite answer.
The sine qua non of any morality at all, of any future for human-
ism, must be the premise that there may be a number of things
that we can do that ought not to be done. Our common inquiry'
must be to fix upon those things that are worthy of man ....
Any other premise amounts to a total abdication of human
87. JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 156-57 (1974).
88. Id. at 157.
89. Id. at 160.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 180. Other ethicists, geneticists and philosophers have asked, for example,
whether or not a basic right exists for every person to be born mentally and physically
sound and whether society has a responsibility to support "the burden of genetic misfor-
tune" among its citizens. Bentley Glass, Heredity and Ethical Problems, 15 PERSPECTIVES
IN BIOLOOY & MED. 237, 252 (1972). See also Smith, supra note 4, at 10. But see LAU-
RENCE KARP, GENETIC ENGINEERING, THREAT OR PROMISE 123 (1976).
92. Ron Docksai, The Limits of Genetic Control, 15 NEW GUARD 21 (1975).
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moral reasoning and judgment and the total abasement of man
before the relentless advancement of biological and medical
technology. 93
While some moral philosophers remain forever optimistic that there is
no real threat to either the concept of sanctity of life or the individual
from genetic knowledge and its application, 94 others have continued to
express a real fear that, with the new advances in technology, procreative
decisions will become increasingly dehumanized. Professor Leon Kass
frames his concern as follows: "At what price-in greater complexity of
society or in our beliefs about what it means to be human-do we seek a
technological fix for the human condition?" 95 The Roman Catholic
Church, historically, the staunch defender of the principles of the sanctity
of life, has cautioned that society must seek to secure justice through rec-
ognition of the inviolability of every person's life.9 6
A major counter-argument to that of the sanctity of human life recog-
nizes that, in the abstract, this principle has never been truly imple-
mented. Rather, it has been violated "innumerable times for the base
purposes of war by the hangman's rope, by local abundance in a world
always pocked by famine."'  Thus, presumably, if man became the true
master of his genetic, fate, he would then rise to the challenge of ex-
panding the meaning of life itself by devising a stronger species that does
not succumb as easily. to the ravages of the race. 98
For some, visions of a new, eugenically sound species resurrect the
specter of the Nazi atrocities, and it is within this context that Professor
Paul Ramsey delivers his fillip to the quality of life argument:
Still, no one should forget the judgment of the leading scholar of
93. P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN 150-51 (1970). See generally Robert Elliott, Iden-
tity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy, 7 BIOETHIcS 27 (1993).
94. JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL (1988); JOHN FLETCHER,
Applied Genetics: No Ultimate Threat, 1 ENGAGE/SOCIAL ACTION 17, 27 (1973). See
Fletcher, supra note 30, at 33.
95. Leon Kass, The Future of Man, The Organism: The New Biology, in AMERICA
AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 55 (1974).
96. 16 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 2 (1974). New genetic knowledge, which in
turn allows for and in some cases promotes, the use of genetic testing, focuses--of neces-
sity-upon prenatal testing that presents an option (for some) of abortion. COOK-DEGAN,
supra, note 71, at 251. And, of course, the choice of abortion on the basis of expected
disability forces the issue of whether predetermined quality in children is a desired social
good. Id.
97. Robert L. Sinsheimer, Prospects for Future Scientific Developments, in ETHICAL,
ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 341, 345 (Hilton & Callahan eds., 1973). See James M. Gus-
tafson, supra note 43, at 190.
98. Sinsheimer, supra note 97, at 348-50. See generally Smith, supra note 11.
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the Nazi medical cases: "Whatever proportion these crimes fi-
nally assumed, it became evident to all who investigated them
that they had started from small beginnings .... It started with
the acceptance of the attitude ... that there is such a thing as life
not worthy to be lived."99
Quality of life arguments most assuredly do not lead all to the same
conclusions. Accordingly,
[q]uality of life should be sought by the cautious improvement
of our cultural and 'environmental resource pools, and not by an
impulsive over-emphasis upon manipulations of a gene pool
whose dynamics and long-term mechanisms still elude us. We
should improve the environment of our handicapped brethren,
we should research means to elevate the intellectual capability'
of our Down's infants, we should seek means to cure phenotypic
anomalies instead of alleviating their owners.'00
The existence of so many diverse viewpoints that are so strongly held
suggests a basic question: How does a society arrive at ethical norms? In
a pluralistic society this is difficult, perhaps impossible, to answer. For
some, religion dictates the construction of the ethical fabric. For others, a
higher moral law directs ethical choices. But society is reactionary.10 1
Being amoeba-like, it shapes itself around controversial issues, changing
and adapting to their impact according to an elusive norm. "The touch-
stone of man's ... ethical choices, is simply his judgment of whether it is
right and good for man. Man is the measure of all things."'" This em-
phatically humanistic approach is echoed by Professor Joseph Fletcher
who maintains that needs are, in actuality, moral stabilizers. "If human
rights conflict with human needs, let needs prevail."' 3 Even Father
Richard McCormick, who argues it is necessary to "blow the whistle"'"
on Fletcher's type of reasoning, worries that Christian arguments "are not
likely going to be very persuasive to a culture which, it can be argued, is
comfort-bent, goal-oriented, technologically sophisticated, sexually trivi-
99. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 164 (1970).
100. Gastonquay, 4 ETHics IN SCI. & MED. 129, 132 (1977).
101. See George P. Smith, II, Procreational Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportu-
nity or Crisis for a Brave New World? 2 NoTRE DAME J.L., ETHics & Pun. POL'Y 635, 635-
36 (1986).
102. aTacey Sonneborn, Ethical Issues Arising from the Possible Uses of Genetic Knowl-
edge, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 1, 5 (1973).
103. Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls: Designed Genetic Changes in
Man, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 782 (1971).
104. McCormick, supra note 82, at 533.
19941
42 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:23
alized and deeply secularized."' 5
Yet, despite these concerns expressed by Father McCormick, and the
slippery nature of the ethical decision-making process, the debate contin-
ues to rage. One philosopher has attempted to define the quality of life
by a mathematical formula, the unspoken assumption being that quality
of life is a proper consideration.10 6 Another authority questions whether
it is moral even to "speculate on social policy based on presumptive ge-
netic differences between groups of individuals" when measures for ge-
netic inheritance are still flawed.'0 7 The notion of calculating cost-benefit
analysis when the stakes are human lives is as shocking to some as it is
logical to others. Daniel Callahan sees such analyses as one-directional.
He charges that they ignore the intangible benefits to a society that is
willing to bear the costs of humane care.'0 8
More than one ethicist is concerned that genetic screening will lead to a
national intolerance of anyone "abnormal." Paul Ramsey sees this conse-
quence of screening as "upgrading the concept of acceptable normal-
ity."'1 9 Undoubtedly, screening will not detect all defects. Leon Kass
wonders if those who manage to "escape the net of detection and abor-
tion" will be regarded as unfit to be alive. 10 Both Ramsey and Kass fear
that the inevitable corollary is that aversion to abnormalities will lead to
mandatory elimination of abnormalities," and ultimately the same justi-
fications for aborting "defective" fetuses may "simultaneously justify the
killing of defective infants, children and adults.""' 2
The lines have been drawn, but they delineate a spectrum of spectacu-
lar diversity. The philosophical rationale for genetic screening may well
105. Id. at 552.
106. Anthony Shaw, Defining the Quality of Life, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1977, at
11.
107. Marc Lappe, What's in the Genes, Anyway, 1 J. VAL. & ETHICS 272 (Summer
1976).
108. Daniel Callahan, The Meaning and Significance of Genetic Disease: Philosophical
Perspectives, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 83, 84-89 (1973).
109. Paul Ramsey, Screening, An Ethicists' View, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENET-
ics 147, 160 (1993)..
110. Leon Kass, Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the Human Right to Life, in
ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 185, 189 (1973).
111. Ramsey, supra note 109, at 159; see generally, Kass, supra note 110. It has been
suggested that for genetic disorders, such as Tay-Sachs and anencephaly, abortion would be
proper if these traits were discovered in utero. Yet, for Huntington's disease-where large
variations exist in the severity and age of onset-there is greater latitude and perhaps a
real choice between the finality of genetic determinism and the hope of environmental
manipulation and scientific advancement. COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 71, at 252-53.
112. Kass, supra note 110, at 188.
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rest on quality of life considerations. The rejoinder may remain an insis-
tent concern for the sanctity of life and a warning against dehumanization
in the face of inexorable technology. Between these two positions, the
search continues for areas of compromise and accommodation.
IV. EQUAL PROTEMCION
A. Immutability As a Basis For Active Judicial Review
In contrast to the lively ethical debate, little has been written about the
extent to which an individual with an abnormal genetic trait as described
above might be included in a suspect class and therefore benefit from the
safeguards of equal protection.' 13 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has identified one criterion by which such an individual might
be deemed a member of a suspect class."' This analytical framework
applies strict scrutiny to a statute which focuses on an immutable charac-
113. At least one article examines the constitutional issues raised by the regulation of,
genetic engineering. John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Ge-
netic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1274 (1986). Professor Attanasio explores the tension between the liberty and equal-
ity principles of American constitutionalism as applied to government regulation of posi-
tive genetic engineering, analyzing in particular whether equal protection jurisprudence
guarantees the rights of a genetically engineered superior minority or of a genetically infer-
ior majority. Id. at 1284. Our essay, however, limits itself to an examination of the extent
to which discrimination against an individual by a state entity, based upon genetic material
rather than a recognized suspect classification, is arguably proscribed by traditional equal
protection, analysis. See also Janet A. Kobrin, Medical Privacy Issue: Confidentiality of
Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1293 (1983) (genetic screening may involve a
Fourteenth Amendment issue to the extent a genetic disease is confined to a specific race).
114. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). This does not suggest that the
Supreme Court has limited its reasoning in identifying a suspect class to one analytical
framework. Rather the Court has adopted several formulations which illuminate the
Court's treatment of certain classifications as suspect:
Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legisla-
tion predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the
constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is
entitled to equal justice under the law. Classifications treated as suspect tend to
be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Finally certain groups, indeed largely
the same groups, have historically been "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." The experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may
manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Legislation imposing special disa-
bilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control
suggests the kind of "class or caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to abolish.
Id. at 216-17 n.14 (citations omitted); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); McLaughlin v.
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teristic over which individuals identified by such characteristic have no
control.115 Although only one analytical tool in the panoply included
under equal protection analysis, this "immutable characteristic" mode of
inquiry reveals more clearly than others the theoretical underpinnings of
equal protection jurisprudence that might be applied to discrimination
based on a genetic trait.1 16 Granted, this constitutional rule extends pro-
tection only to those individuals adversely affected by state action.
1 17
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943);
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
115. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 603 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 301 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473
U.S. 433, 437-38, 442-45 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982); Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 229 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496, 516, 519, 525
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring; Marshall, J., concurring; Stewart, J., dissenting); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); University of Cal. Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1977) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
116. These theoretical underpinnings have been most fully analyzed in the context of
gay rights. In arguing that homosexuality should be treated as a suspect classification,
commentators have relied upon, among others, the immutable characteristic basis for iden-
tifying a suspect class. Nan D. Hunter, Symposium: the State of Civil Liberties: Where, do
we go from here? Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531, 549-50, (1993);
Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As a Suspect Classifi-
cation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1299-1305 (1985). Indeed, a recent DNA study has pro-
vided yet more evidence of the immutable character of sexual preference. Dean H.,
Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual
Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993). See also Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology,
ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Mar. 1993, at 47; Christopher B. Daly, Study of Twins Suggests Les-
bianism Has a Genetic Component, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1993, at A3.
In determining whether a particular classification is suspect, the majority of courts and,
writers focus on the "stigma" and "opprobrium" attached to membership in that group
and, that group's resulting unequal treatment. Note, supra at 1299 (citing Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1127 (1969)). There are two
other generally accepted criteria for suspectness, ihe "immutability" of the group's, defin-
ing qualities, id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677, 686 (1973)), and the, status
of the group as a "discrete and insular minority," id. (citing United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)), have been the subject of bitter disagreements
among theorists as to their relative significance. Id.; see also JOHN H. ELY" DEMOCRACY
AND DimTRusT 163-64 (1980); Lawrence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980).
117. The constitutional mandate of equal protection is directed to the states: "No States
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Note,
supra note 116, at 1069-71 (1969) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I). However, the
Supreme Court has construed the amendment to apply to a broad area of "state responsi-
bility." Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)). Fur-
thermore, the courts have recognized state action in a variety of forms and degrees of state
involvement. Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966)).
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Nonetheless, the recognition of such rights has in the past served as a
starting point for legislation ,applicable to private entities.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,"' the United States Supreme Court intro-
duced the concept that the possession of an immutable characteristic
should be a basis for identifying a suspect status." 9 The immutable char-
acteristic in Frontiero was sex, which the Court found, like race and na-
tional origin, to be determined solely by accident of birth. 2 ' The Court
reasoned that the imposition of a particular disability on the members of
a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the principle
that legal burdens should be related to individual responsibility.' 2 ' Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the Court, however, carefully distinguished sex
from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability. Un-
like intelligence or physical disability, the Court noted that sex frequently
bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society. 22 Fi-
nally, the Court characterized the impermissible result of distinctions
based on sex as "invidiously" relegating the entire class of females to in-
ferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of individual
women.
123
Similarly, to the extent such genetic information is publicly available,
statutory distinctions based upon such markers have the identical invidi-
ous effect of relegating a class of individuals to inferior legal status. Such
markers thus become a genetic scarlet letter, a badge or incident of ge-
netic dissimilarity or variation which .although always present in the ge-
netic material of a class of individuals, bears no relationship to their
functionality as members of society. 24 The application of this analytical
framework to the genetic abnormalities described above leads to a con-
118. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
119. Id. at 686-87.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 686.
122. Id. (citing Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 116, at
1173-74).
123. Id. at 687.
124. Daniel J. Kevies & Leroy Hood, The Deoxyribonucleic Acid Test, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Dec. 6, 1992, (This World), at 8. For example, on or around 1970, fear spread that individu-
als with sickle-cell trait-those who possess a recessive gene for the disease-might suffer
damage to red blood cells in the reduced oxygen of high altitudes. The Air Force Acad-
emy, therefore, implemented a policy prohibiting such individuals (the overwhelming ma-
jority of whom were black) from enrolling. Furthermore, several major commercial air
carriers restricted such individuals to ground duty; these individuals were also charged
higher insurance premiums. The fact that these individuals were permanently asymptom-
atic heterozygotes (carriers) for the recessive sickle-cell genetic condition identifies this
group as a class bearing such incidents of genetic difference which although always present
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clusion that suspect status is appropriate for those individuals who pos-
sess a genetic abnormality that does not inhibit those individuals'
functionality. First, a genetic defect is clearly immutable to the extent
that no technology currently exists that can change the makeup of any
individual possessing that trait. Thus, as with sex, which is itself a geneti-
cally determined characteristic, genetic markers identifying an individual
as at risk for or as a carrier of cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, or
Huntington's chorea define a suspect class.
The next crucial question posed by Justice Brennan's analysis is the
extent to which such a genetic marker inhibits current function. To the
extent an individual falls into a category which identifies him for discrimi-
nation-i.e., those individuals who are asymptomatic but carry a gene(s)
that increases the probability that they will develop some disease, individ-
uals who are, heterozygotes (carriers) for some recessive or X-linked ge-
netic condition but who are and will remain asymptomatic, individuals
who have one or more genetic polymorphisms that are not known to
cause any medical condition, and immediate relatives of individuals with
known or presumed genetic conditions-such individuals, by definition,
have no current dysfunction that relates to "ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society."12 Thus, under the test proposed in Frontiero, any state
action implicating such a genetic trait would be subject to strict scrutiny
and most probably struck down.
B. Stigma As a Basis For Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has also examined the extent to which stigma
either alone or in conjunction with an immutable characteristic should be
a basis for identifying a suspect class and applying concomitant strict scru-
tiny to regulations or legislation which reflect such a stigma.126 The
Court stated that "any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group
or that singles out those least well represented in the political process"
in the genetic material of those individuals, the trait bears no relationship to their function-
ality as members of society. Id. at 10.
125. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
126. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,361-62 (1978) (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.)); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (opinion of Marshall, J.); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); id.
at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-
62 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Genetic Determinism or Discrimination?
and held that the appropriate standard of review is "not 'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact, because it is stigma that causes fatality-but strict and
searching nonetheless."127 Thus, in addition to ascertaining the extent to
which a particular characteristic is immutable, the Court has taken into
consideration the extent to which a characteristic results in some stigma
or burden imposed upon the group defined by that characteristic. 128
V. PRIVACY AND SCARLET LETTERS OF GENETIC DISSIMILARIry
The genetic marker, a common characteristic from which an individual
cannot escape, necessitates strict judicial scrutiny not only because it is
immutable but because it results in social stigma. Again the genetic ma-
terial of an individual, to the extent it is public information, results in a
figurative scarlet letter signifying genetic dissimilarity or variation and en-
sures discriminatory treatment. Although equal protection theory and
resulting antidiscrimination measures provide methods of alleviating the
stigma associated with public disclosure of genetic information, another
option for protecting individuals with genetic abnormalities lies in limit-
ing the disclosure of such information from the outset. Constitutional
and legal support for such a policy may be derived from the individual's
fundamental right to privacy.
A. Judicially Derived Privacy Interests
The public dissemination of genetic information and resulting stigma
attached thereto implicate another constitutional interest, the individual's
stake in maintaining the privacy of such information. Conceivably, dis-
crimination could be avoided if no information were available upon
which distinctions could be made between those individuals with "nor-
mal" genotypes and those with abnormal genetic characteristics. In con-
trast to equal protection, this area has been more fully charted by
commentators. 29 Unfortunately, there appears to be little protection in
127. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (opinion of Bren-
nan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
128. At least one commentator has suggested that these two factors essentially recast
the test set forth in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., equating foot-
note four's insistence on discreetness and insularity to a correspondent insistence on, "im-
mutability-on the power of observers unambiguously to associate individuals with the
minority, on the inability of individuals to drift out of the minority to which they are as-
signed." Janet E. Haley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915, 931 (1989).
129. See Nobles, supra note 2, at 2097; Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 75, at 758, 763,
787-88; NicHoLAs A. AsHFoRD ET AL., MONITORING THE WORKER FOR EXPOSURE AND
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the area of employment or insurance apart from theoretical constitutional
restraints upon public employers, and scattered state constitutional 3 '
and statutory privacy provisions.13 1 The federal constitutional restraints,
however, reveal several bases upon which courts might discern a funda-
mental privacy interest applicable to the genetic material of a particular
individual. They also provide support for legislative measures to protect
the privacy of genetic material.
Privacy has been identified in a number of Supreme Court cases as a
fundamental value of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 132 However, it
was not until Griswold v. Connecticut'33 that the Court derived an in-
dependent right to privacy from the confluence of several provisions of
the Bill of Rights.'34 This "penumbral" zone of privacy has been held to
include a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy,135 but has not ex-
DISEASE: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF Bi-
OMARKERS 125-39 (1990); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOLOGY, MEDICINE,
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS-SPECIAL REPORT 15 (1988); L. ANDREWS, THE FUTURE OF
CONFIDENTIALITY OF GENETIC INFORMATION, in MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRON-
TIER 209 (1987).
130. Council on Ethical Judicial Affairs, supra note 19, at 2094. This particular author
noted that state constitutional provisions protecting the right of privacy are found in
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina,
and Washington. California, in particular, prohibits reasonable searches and seizures by
private and public employers. CAL. CONST. art I, § 13 (West 1982).
131. Nobles, supra note 2, at 2094 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-302 - 50-16-314 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37.3-1 - 5-37.3-10
(1956 & Supp. 1982)).
132. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)
(procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and
education).
133. 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
134. Id. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, stated:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of associa-
tion contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any
house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surren-
der to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
Id. at 484.
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See George P. Smith, II & Roberto Iraola,
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tended protection to private consensual sodomy,' 36 a depositor's interest
in not disclosing bank records, 37 or a taxpayer's interest in not disclosing
tax records. 138 Nor has a privacy right been recognized for the otherwise
proper acquisition and use of non-testimonial evidence. 139
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a privacy interest in a
case analogous to the problem of disclosure of genetic information. In
Whalen v. Roe,"4 the Court scrutinized a New York State statute which
required that the State record in a centralized computer file the names
and addresses of all persons who had obtained, pursuant to a doctor's
prescription, drugs for which there were both lawful and unlawful mar-
kets.' 4' The statutory scheme was attacked as an invasion of an individ-
ual's privacy interest against disclosure of personal matters. 42 The Court
recognized this interest as falling within the "zone of privacy" but, be-
cause of the extensive security measures protecting the identity of pa-
tients from disclosure, the Court concluded that the New York program
did not pose a sufficiently "grievous" threat to establish a constitutional
violation.143
The Court in Whalen did not explicitly articulate the standard of review
applied to the New York statute in its analysis. However, the extensive
analysis of the statutory provisions for maintaining patient confidentiality
suggests that the Court strictly scrutinized the statutory framework in
light of the important privacy interests at issue. 144 Indeed, the Court
went so far as to include in the record the independent investigation of
similar California and Illinois reporting systems, both of which failed to
reveal a single case of invasion of a patient's privacy.' 45 Although not
totally clear, the Supreme Court's holding in Whalen confirms the weight
accorded to an individual's constitutional interest in not disclosing per-
Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARO. L. REv. 263 (1984). See generally
George P. Smith, II, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally Handicapped,
4 J. CoNytEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71 (1988).
136. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
137. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
138. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
139. Id. at 399.
140. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
141. Id. at 591.
142. Id. at 598-99. The Court also recognized the interest of the individual in the in-
dependent making of important decisions, such as the decision to receive medication with-
out the threat of being labeled a drug addict. Id. at 599-600.
143. Id. at 600.
144. Id. at 600-03.
145. Id. at 601 n.27.
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sonal information and the concomitant importance of protecting such an
individual from the stigma of public scrutiny and reputational damage.
B. Fourth Amendment Interests
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that: "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. .."146 The Amendment guarantees the privacy of persons
against invasive acts by officers of the government 147 or private parties
acting as an instrument or agent of the government. 48 Where the gov-
ernment or its agent seeks to obtain physical evidence from a person, the
Fourth Amendment privacy rights may be implicated in varying de-
grees. 49 Also, the Supreme Court has long recognized that physical in-
trusion which penetrates beneath the skin for the purpose of drawing
blood for chemical analysis constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.' 5 °
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,'5' the United States
Supreme Court concluded that Fourth Amendment concerns were impli-
cated by a drug and alcohol testing program prescribed by Federal Rail-
way Administration regulations.' 52 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that, like blood-testing, chemical analysis of urine reveals many pri-
vate medical facts about an employee including such conditions as preg-
nancy, epilepsy, and diabetes.'5 3 Having recognized the existence of a
Fourth Amendment interest, the Court proceeded to determine whether,
in light of the government's interest in implementing such a drug testing
program, the search was reasonable and thus constitutionally permissi-
146. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
147. Skinner v. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14; Camara v. Municipal
Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
148. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
149. For example, initial detention of the person for the purpose of gathering evidence,
may constitute a violation if the detention amounts to a meaningful interference with free-
dom of movement. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,215 (1984); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113-14;
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27
(1969).
150. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
151. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
152. Id. at 618-19.
153. Id. at 617. The Supreme Court also agreed with the observation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that "few activities in our society are more
personal or private than the passing of urine." Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)).
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ble.154 In its determination of the reasonableness of the search, the Court
noted that although in most instances such a search must be accompanied
by a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause,'55 the case fell within
the recognized "special needs" exception making the warrant and prob-
able cause requirement impracticable.5 6 Thus, the Court proceeded to
balance the governmental and privacy interests to determine the reasona-
bleness of such a policy in light of all of the circumstances surrounding
the search or seizure.' 7
This result has great -significance when considering the prospect of a
constitutional challenge to any genetic testing program, whether adminis-
tered by the government or a private party acting at its behest. Although
Skinner recognizes a Fourth Amendment privacy interest, it also indicates
the willingness of the Court to accord, through a balancing process, little
weight to the fundamental privacy right in comparison to the govern-
ment's interest in obtaining and retaining information from any proce-
dure, whether it be a blood test, urinalysis, or DNA fingerprint.' 58
There is, however, a basis for distinguishing a DNA test from these
other procedures that may accord testing greater future protections.
Namely, DNA mapping reveals characteristics inherent to the individual
from whom the sample is drawn. Unlike a test for drugs or alcohol,
which represents the concentrations of these substances at only one point
in time, any variation from the normal genotype revealed by a DNA test
represents a characteristic that is immutable during the lifetime of the
individual. Arguably, the individual's privacy interest in such an immuta-
ble characteristic should be accorded greater weight for it provides a
means of placing that individual in a discrete class. Nevertheless, in light
154. Id. at 619.
155. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
156. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
157. Id.
158. The Court, in a decision issued on the same day, incorporated by reference the
analytical framework articulated in Skinner and reached the same result on the facts
presented in Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656. The balancing of the rela-
tive interests of the government and those privacy interests asserted by the treasury em-
ployees seeking relief from a similar drug testing regulation lead to the same result as
Skinner. See also Kobrin, supra note 113, at 1293.
Interestingly, a recent Office of Technology Assessment survey of 500 U.S. companies
found only one percent had policies on genetic testing of applicants or employees. Sixty
percent of the company health offices said the decision to perform such tests should be the
employer's. David Brown, Individual Genetic Privacy Seen as Threatened, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 1991, at A6. See also Mark A. Rothstein, Discrimination Based on Genetic Infor-
mation, 33 JuRiMmETRics J. 13 (1992).
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of the Court's increasing willingness to sacrifice privacy rights asserted
under the Fourth Amendment in favor of government policy,159 it ap-
pears unlikely that the Fourth Amendment alone can effectively serve as
the basis for a successful constitutional challenge to DNA testing.
VI. THE HUMAN GENOME PRIVACY Acr: A MODEL
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION?
In the area of privacy, there has been only one federal legislative pro-
posal which, as a model statute, merits study. The Human Genome Pri-
vacy Act (HGPA) was introduced before the House of Representatives
by Representative Conyers on September 13, 1990.'60 Although no ac-
tion was taken on the bill following its introduction, its language responds
in many respects to the problems of confidentiality of genetic information
in the workplace and it may be fully expected that similar, legislation will
be proposed over time. 61 The purpose of the bill was to safeguard indi-
vidual privacy of genetic information by proscribing the misuse of records
maintained by agencies or their contractors or grantees for the purposes
of research, diagnosis, treatment, or identification of genetic disorders. 62
159. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S..at 656.
160. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). This legislation is no longer pending. In
October, 1992, Congress adjourned sine di. Thus, all unpassed bills pending at that time
died. This HGPA or similar legislation, has not been reintroduced.
Internationally, it has been suggested that either a moratorium be imposed on the collec-
tion and use of genetic information until the Council of Europe can draft an appropriate
Bioethics Convention dealing with the area or-alternatively-an expanded interpretation
of Articles 2 and 26 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights can be
sought. These two articles prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, or religion.
Sjef Gevers, Use of Genetic Data, Employment and Insurance: An International Perspec-
tive, 7 BIoETHicS 126 (1993).
After two years of study, the Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe has
recently produced a draft convention on Bioethics and referred it to the European govern-
ments for consultation. Tony Sheldon, European Experts Produce Draft on Bioethics, 309
BR. MED. J. 221 (July 23, 1994). See generally YVONNE M. CRIPPS, CONTROLLING TECH-
NOLOGY: GENETICS, ETHics & THE LAW, ch. 5 (1980).
161. Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the
Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 108 (1991). The authors identify a need for new poli-
cies protecting the confidentiality of genetic information and suggest the drafting of a
model law. The model statute advocated in the article would mandate that job applicants
and employees be informed if they will be subject to genetic screening or genetic monitor-
ing. Furthermore, the results of such testing would be available to the employee on re-
quest. Disclosure to employers would be limited to information about the individual's
fitness to perform a particular job. Finally, disclosure to third parties would be prohibited
without employee consent. Id.
162. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
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The bill would have provided' to individuals access to records concerning
their genome as maintained for any purpose by agencies of the federal
government.163 The language of the proposed legislation may be studied
as a potential model for future legislation. The bill is divided into five
sections. Part A sets forth the definitions for purposes of the Act. It
broadly defines "genetic information" as "any information that identifies
all or any part of a genome identifiable to a specific individual."'"
Part B, entitled "Inspection of Genetic Information," requires a gov-
ernment agency165 to permit an individual to inspect and have a copy of
any genetic information the agency maintains about the individual. 166 It
further sets forth procedures for correcting or supplementing genetic in-
formation held by an agency. 167 Section 114 of the Act,'16 entitled "Dis-
closure of Genetic Information," proscribes the unauthorized 69
disclosure of genetic information about an individual other than to the
individual or the individual's designated representative. Section 116 of
the Act requires an agency 'that provides by contract or grant for the
maintenance, development, analysis, or identification of genetic informa-
tion, to apply the Act to such information, thus making the Act and re-
163. Id.
164. Id. § 101(2).
165. "Agency" is defined in Part A as "any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, Government contractors,
or Government grantees maintaining genetic information pursuant to Federal contracts
and/or, grants or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (includ-
ing the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." Id.
§ 101(1).
166. Id. § 111(a)(1).
167. Id. § 112(a).
168. Id. § 114.
169. The predicate for proper authorization is set forth in detail in section 115 of the
Act. This section requires that an individual has authorized disclosure to a person of ge-
netic information maintained by the agency only if:
(1) the authorization is (A) in writing, (B) dated, and (C) signed by the
individual;
(2) the agency is specifically named or generically described in the authorization
as authorized to disclose such information;
(3) the person to whom the information is to be disclosed is specifically or generi-
cally described in the authorization as the person to whom such information may
be disclosed;
(4) the information to be disclosed is described in the authorization;
(5) the purpose of the disclosure is specified in the authorization; and
(6) the disclosure occurs before the date of the event (if any), specified in the
authorization, upon which the authorization expires.
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suiting regulations applicable to government contractors or grantees.170
Part C of the Act delineates exceptions to the above described nondis-
closure rule, allowing unauthorized disclosures: (1) within an agency for
official use;17 1 (2) to a medical professional for use in connection with
care or treatment of the individual; 17 2 (3) for specified health and safety
reasons; 173 and (4) as directed by a court. 74 Part D further allows unau-
thorized disclosure to a law enforcement agency for identification or loca-
tion of a suspect or fugitive. 75 It also sets forth access procedures for law
enforcement summonses, subpoenas, warrants, and search warrants176
and provides for challenge procedures to law enforcement summonses
and subpoenas. 177
Part E of the Act, entitled "Enforcement," establishes criminal penal-
ties for requesting or obtaining genetic information or authorization from
an individual through false pretenses or theft.'78 It further provides for
civil relief by any individual whose rights have been knowingly or negli-
gently violated,'179 and criminal penalties for the knowing improper dis-
closure of information as well as for the failure to comply with the notice
requirements of the Act.' 80
The most illuminating part of this legislation is set forth in the findings
and purposes section. Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 2. (a) The Congress finds that -
(1) the right to privacy is a personal and basic right protected by
the Constitution of the United States;
(2) the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of ge-
netic information can threaten an individual's right to privacy;
(3) the increasing use of biotechnology and sophisticated ge-
netic screening techniques in the advancement of the Human
Genome Project and the expanded understanding of the genetic
links to a variety of physical and psychological diseases and dis-
170. Id. § 116.
171. Id. § 122.
172. Id. § 123.
173. Id. § 124.
174. Id. § 125.
175. Id. § 131(a)(1).
176. Id. § 132. This section adopts the constitutionally protected requirement of rea-
sonable grounds and probable cause in instances where a law enforcement authority wishes
to gain unauthorized access to genetic records from an agency. Id. § 132(b)(1).
177. Id. § 133.
178. Id. § 141(a).
179. Id. § 142(a).
180. Id. § 143(a).
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orders have greatly magnified the potential harm to individual
privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or
dissemination of personal genetic information;
(4) the opportunities for an individual to secure education, em-
ployment, health care, insurance, and credit, and his or her right
to due process and other legal protections are endangered by
the misuse of genetic information systems;
(5) in order to protect the genetic privacy of individuals in in-
formational systems maintained by agencies, it is necessary and
proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, maintenance,
use and dissemination of information by such agencies. 181
The recognition in sections 1 and 2 of a fundamental privacy right regard-
ing an individual's genetic material is crucial to extending protection to
those individuals with abnormal genotypes. 182 Section 3 recognizes the
increasing threat to privacy interests occasioned by the use of genetic
screening as well as the further advancement of the Human Genome Pro-
ject.183 Finally, section 4 specifies those areas of education, employment,
health care, insurance, and credit in which, pursuant to section 5, Con-
gress has an interest in protecting the rights of genetically "abnormal"
persons.' 84
However worthy the statement of policy set forth in the above section,
the question nevertheless arises as to whether language such as that advo-
cated in the HGPA is the most effective means to reach this end. 85 For
example, although section (2)(a)(4) of the HGPA specifies "due process"
as one of the constitutionally protected rights that should be accorded to
the genetically dissimilar, it is not clear whether equal protection as a
basis for non-discrimination is included in due process. 86 The actual
181. Id. § 2(a).
182. Id. § 2(a)(1), (2).
183. Id. § 2(a)(3).
184. Id. § 2(a)(4), (5).
185. At least one commentator has questioned its potential efficacy and concluded that
although well intentioned and timely, the Act's effectiveness is doubtful. Nobles, supra
note 2, at 2119. It was observed first that its operative language is vague and, furthermore,
that many of the requirements imposed on federal agencies by the act are already in force.
Finally, the objectives, if not the language of the HGPA, are already reflected in the cur-
rent versions of the Privacy Act as well as various state statutes. Id. (citing Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988)). It has been proposed that the policy objective of the HGPA
be implemented by amendment to preexisting laws such as the Privacy Act, the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 2119-20 (citing Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12011-12213 (1990); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988)).
186. H.R. 5612, § 2(a)(4).
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terms of the legislation do not define discrimination or articulate protec-
tions or relief from discrimination. Thus, although the protection of due
process rights appears to be one of the main goals of the legislation, such
protection is cast exclusively in terms of privacy. In relying exclusively on
privacy, the HGPA has left unused one of the principal constitutional im-
plements by which the rights of individuals with abnormal genotypes
might be protected.
Furthermore, it appears from a policy perspective that the HGPA over-
laps with two important federal statutes. In lieu of enacting new law,
Congress could easily amend either the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)' 87 or the Federal Privacy Act' to include relevant provisions of
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The ADA prevents employers from discriminating
against individuals who have or have had a history of a disability that involves a mental or
physical impairment that limits a major life activity. See Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Ge-
netic Defect Is a Disability Under the Americans With Disabilities Act Preventing Genetic
Discrimination by Employers, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 118 (1992). Section 102(a) of the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) states:
No covered entity [employer, employment agency, labor organization or joint la-
bor-management committee excluding the federal government] shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112.
Section 102(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(A), continues by prohibiting pre-
employment medical examinations. Accordingly, no pre-employment questionnaires may
be used by prospective employers nor may they inquire of potential employees whether
they have any medical conditions such as epilepsy, diabetes, or hypertension. Only ques-
tions that focus on specific, job related functions may be asked of applicants. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(c)(4)(B). This statutory prohibition against pre-employment medical examina-
tions will assist greatly in curing abuses in discriminatory hiring that would otherwise be
based on genetic testing.
Regarding disabilities under the ADA, the current policy is "can't ask, don't tell." The
major uncertainty with this policy is whether a genetic trait that has not manifested itself
counts as a disability within the meaning of the statute. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV.
1, 13-18 (1994).
188. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). The Privacy Act restricts the type of
information that the federal government may collect. Thus, it provides that the govern-
ment may retain only the minimal amount of records possible. The statute provides: "(e)
Agency requirements.-Each agency that maintains a system of records shall-(1) main-
tain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive
order of the President." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). Furthermore, subject to certain exceptions,
the Act provides for protections from disclosure:
(b) Conditions of disclosure.-No agency shall disclose any record which is con-
tained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to
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the HGPA. Although addressing analogous discrimination and privacy
issues, the ADA and the Privacy Act fall short of extending explicit pro-
tection to asymptomatic individuals with abnormal genotypes.'8 9 Thus, it
appears that the most fruitful path in the legislative arena would be by
amendment to these legislative schemes. These statutes, as amended,
should recognize the fundamental importance of privacy and equality
rights while explicitly extending the protection of these principles to
problems of discrimination based on genetic information. Such amend-
ments to an established statutory framework would simplify the process
of effectuating newly enacted protections, rather than establishing a new
area of law subject to the promulgation of regulations and judicial
clarification.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Advances in rDNA technology and screening techniques have created
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). This legislation, however, only serves as a protection against disclosure
by the federal government.
189. See Gurd, supra note 187, at 118. Because of the statutory requirement of some
past or present disfunction, many individuals who have a genetic defect are not covered.
Furthermore, the ADA is inapplicable to carriers or individuals receiving treatment to
prevent gene expression. Accordingly, the ADA provides no protection from discrimina-
tion based on an individual's genetic profile. See also Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimina-
tion: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and
Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 110, 123 (1991) (explaihing that a genetic condition which
does not cause substantial impairment may not constitute a disability as defined under the
ADA). The agency charged with enforcing the ADA, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, has determined that there is no individual coverage under the law until one is
determined to be symptomatic. Thus, presymptomatic individuals with late or onset disor-
ders, as for example adult polycystic kidney disease, would have no coverage under the
Act. Similarly, those carriers of recessive disorders such as cystic fibrosis are also not cov-
ered and could be denied employment. Neil A. Holtzman & Mark A. Rothstein, Invited
Editoria" Eugenics and Genetic Discrimination, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENEncs 457, 458 (1992).
See also Eric T. Juengst, Priorities in Professional Ethics and Social Policy for Human Ge-
netics, 266 JAMA 1835 (1991).
What can be seen in the disability rights movement is a direct ideological challenge to
medical genetics or genetic determinism. It has been urged that rather than prevent the
birth of persons with significant disabilities (e.g., blindness), society should change the
ways in which it views these individuals and thus accept them as equals. COOK-DEEGAN,
supra note 71, at 252.
With respect to the Privacy Act, the main defect is that it restricts only the types of
information that may be collected by the federal government. However, its provisions
seem to apply broadly, and would thus include genetic information with other types of
personal data. See Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 161, at 101.
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a new genus in the taxonomy of genetic information that is particularly
susceptible to misuse both by state and private entities. As with any new
invention-whether a genetically altered plant or a laboratory technique
for identifying mental illness-such technical capability and resulting in-
formation is often met with fear.'9° Similarly, those individuals identified
by such technology as genetically distinct from the social norm are at risk
for disparate and intrusive treatment.191
The perception by both public and private institutions that identifying
and singling out persons with genetic abnormalities serve either public or
private commercial interest in turn sets the stage for an erosion of funda-
mental privacy rights based on such genetic information. Whatever the
risks from the perspective of individual rights, however, it is increasingly
clear that rDNA techniques and the valuable knowledge they generate
provide great hope for alleviating human suffering both as diagnostic
measures to avoid genetically related illness and as therapeutic tech-
niques to cure such illness.' 92 Discerning a rational course between the
often conflicting interests of individual rights and the greater social good
in the application of rDNA technology presents particularly difficult
problems regarding how to apply existing constitutional precedent and
public policy to this new technology. Indeed, the factual permutations
raised by the use of rDNA and screening techniques appear at first con-
sideration novel and strange.
Closer examination, however, reveals recurring constitutional and pol-
icy questions. For example, to the extent such genetic markers are immu-
table characteristics which subject a class of individuals to any stigma, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment arguably recog-
nizes the need for heightened judicial scrutiny of government action af-
fecting such a suspect class.' 93 Exacting judicial scrutiny imposes on the
state and its agents a higher standard of rationality. As with any suspect
class like race or alienage, such scrutiny attempts to discern the extent to
190. In light of the attempts by the eugenics movement to wield limited technology this
fear is perhaps not unreasonable. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS Ch. XIII (1985).
191. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Rick Weiss, Genetic Counsel-
ing's New Challenge, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1994, (Health Magazine), at 10; Owen D. Jones,
Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A Regulatory Framework for Trait-
Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (1993).
193. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). See also supra note 101 and accompa-
nying text.
9 Genetic Determinism or Discrimination?
which fear or prejudice may have supplanted rational discourse in the
making of public policy.
Similarly, fundamental privacy rights recognize an individual's interest
in not disclosing personal information that might hold him or her up to
unnecessary public scrutiny and reputational damage. 94 This principle
applies with particular force to an individual's interest in concealing from
public scrutiny the makeup of his or her genetic map.'95 Although these
rights, especially as defined by the Fourth Amendment, are qualified
when balancing society's interest in obtaining and using genetic informa-
tion courts and legislatures should give great weight to the private nature
of such information given its personalized and sensitive nature.
Finally, in the legislative sphere, the logical complement to recognizing
rights of equal protection and privacy for individuals with genetic abnor-
malities is the extension of those rights as protections not only against
state action but also against private entities. Amendments to both the
ADA'9 6 and the Federal Privacy Act 1" would effectuate the stated pur-
pose of the Human Genome Privacy Act, 9 ' while avoiding its vagueness
and technical flaws. More important, such legislation would further ad-
vance the principle that absent some compelling reason, private individu-
als and institutions will be charged with treating individuals, whose
genetic maps diverge from the norm, as they would a person with a com-
pletely normal genotype.
Quite obviously, the wide number of social dislocations produced by
the biotechnological advances of the New Biology neither must nor
should be a serious matter of constitutional concern.' 99 Rather, efforts
should be undertaken with resolve to sharpen ethical constructs for prin-
cipled decision making within 'the professional bodies concerned with the
development and management of the New Biology. The state legislatures
and courts should-in partnership with medical scientists, ethicists, phi-
losophers, and the other architects of the new biological sciences-en-
deavor to regulate, and thereby resolve, the complexities of these
194. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
195. See generally Kobrin, supra note 113.
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Americans with
Disabilities Act and The Corpus of Anti-Discrimination Law: A Force for Change in the
Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH-MATRIX: J.L. MED. 89 (1993) (discussing
the ADA).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
198. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
199. Sheila Jasanoff, Biology and The Bill of Rights: Can Science Reframe the Constitu-
tion?, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 249, 288 (1987).
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biotechnological sciences.2"
To be sure, the constitutional challenges raised as a direct consequence
of the startling advances in bio-science are unique, for they hold every
promise of changing some of the most fundamental principles of this
country's political order-challenges "that the individual human being is
autonomous and exercises free will, that all people are entitled to equal
treatment, that individuals enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their dealings with the state and that freedom of scientific inquiry and
expression can flourish along with freedom of religion."
201
While the Human Genome Initiative will provide startling genetic
maps, it remains for the law to sequence or identify the policy issues in-
herent in the complex issues of medical genetics and then to proceed to
map them or, in other words, determine them and then resolve them to
the extent possible within legal doctrines.2 °2 This, in turn, forces a need
to examine critically the true social significance of the concepts of nor-
mality and abnormality.20 a With this all comes a fear-rational or irra-
tional-that laws will be passed requiring everyone to submit to gene
therapy or even, as the case may warrant, "provide personally identifiable
genetic material for purely scientific uses." 2' Yet, interestingly, individu-
als are less likely to be interested in knowing about their genetic profiles
if they are obsessed with an overriding fear that such knowledge will then
be used to punish them. Society thus will be forced to develop both ethi-
cal and legal norms designed to protect those members of society at
higher risk from genetic discrimination.205
From a more positive side, universal access to the wide opportunities of
genetic services will allow persons "to act on the perception that it is good
to want to know about genetic risks."2° Accordingly, when the benefits
of genetic diagnosis and treatment become more evident over time, ge-
netic information will, in turn, become far less threatening and
200. Id.
201. Id. at 287. See George P. Smith, II, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and
the New Biology, 3 PACE L. REv. 63 (1982).
202. Lori B. Andrews, Genetics and the Law, Introduction, 39 EMORY L.J. 619, 620
(1990).
203. Alexander M. Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern
Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 665, 694 (1990). See Rick Weiss, Getting New Genes, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 1994, (Health Magazine), at 11.
204. See Capron; supra note 203, at 695. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnol-
ogy and The Design of Regulation, 17 EcoLooY L.Q. 1 (1990).
205. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 75, at 759. See COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 71, at ch.
XVI.
206. Id.
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stigmatizing.2 7
In order to meet these new challenges, law and sciences must march
together as full partners and not-as in the past-with law behind the
scientific cadence. All too often, as former Chief Justice Warren E. Bur-
ger observed, "[t]he law does not search out as do science and medicine;
it reacts to social needs and demands."2 "8 It is thus vitally incumbent
upon the law to develop a contemporary agenda for social change and
changing socio-political needs instead of responding simply to or reacting
to change itself-especially so here with the Age of The New Biology.20 9
In the final analysis, then, it is well to recognize that: "Each new power
won by man is a power over man as well."'21
207. Id.
208. Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, reprinted in 1
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAvE NEW WORLD 211 (George P.
Smith, II, ed., 1982).
209. See Michael J. Flower & Deborah Heath, Micro-Anatomo Politics: Mapping The
Human Genome Project, 17 CULTURE, MED. AND PSYCHIATRY 27 (1993); George P. Smith,
II, Biomedicine and Biomedical Ethics: De Lege Latta, De Lege Ferenda, 9 J. CoNTEmp.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233 (1993).
210. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLrrION OF MAN 71 (1965).
19941

